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COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS:  
TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE 
Charlotte Clarke 
INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this paper pertains to a relatively new concept known as a 
Community Benefits Agreement (hereinafter “CBA”). Although this con-
cept was born in the nineties1, for the purpose of addressing the impacts of 
development projects on communities, CBAs recently gained momentum as 
a result of cities and municipalities becoming increasingly popular for large 
scale developments such as sports arenas and high rise apartment build-
ings.2 At their inception CBAs allowed communities to negotiate directly 
with developers, and gave communities the opportunity to address problems 
associated with a development project.3 CBAs are defined differently de-
pending on whom one asks, however, generally a CBA is a contract or 
agreement between a developer and a community group or community coa-
lition in the area a developer plans to build.4 CBAs contain a set of guide-
lines or rules that developers should abide by to ensure that the community 
benefits from the project or proposed development. 
A development project can produce many positive outcomes for munici-
palities and states alike, such as: government attention, increased services to 
neighborhoods involved in the development, building restoration, enter-
 
 1. Patricia E. Salkin, Amy Lavine, Community Benefits Agreements And Compre-
hensive Planning: Balancing Community Empowerment And The Police Power, 
18 J.L. & Pol’y 157, 177 (2009) (citing Patricia Salkin & Amy Lavine, Under-
standing Community Benefits Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice 
and Other Considerations for Developers, Municipalities and Community Organ-
izations, 26 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 291, 301-306) (discussing the Hollywood 
and Highland CBA). 
 2. Patricia E. Salkin, Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits Agreements: 
Equitable Development, Social Justice And Other Considerations For Develop-
ers, Municipalities And Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 
291, 292-297 (2008). 
 3. Id. at 292-93. 
 4. See generally Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, 
And Legal Enforceability, J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L., Fall 
2007/Winter 2008, at 35- 37 (2008). 
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tainment, an increased tax base, and an increased property value.5 However, 
such development also causes gentrification.6 Generally speaking, gentrifi-
cation is an influx of more affluent residents which disproportionately 
changes the demographic of a particular area, causing the previous residents 
to relocate.7 Development projects cater to individuals in a higher socio-
economic status by offering expensive retail and entertainment options.8 
This causes the displacement of many residents who can no longer afford to 
live in their communities, or surrounding neighborhoods, as a result of a 
project increasing property values or increasing the base rent for a particular 
area.9 Urban development highlights gentrification, displacement, and low 
community involvement.10 
Hopefully CBAs can prevent gentrification from taking place by creating 
benefits for the preexisting community, coupled with community involve-
ment pertaining to a project.11 Optimistically, those incentives will encour-
age existing residents to remain in their neighborhood, and the character of 
the community will not drastically change as a result of gentrification. Even 
with a CBA in place, that does not necessarily mean that an area will stay 
affordable or that gentrification will halt completely. 
As previously mentioned, in a CBA the developer promises services or 
goods to the community in exchange for their support for the project, or in 
exchange for acquiescence concerning the project. For example, a CBA can 
contain a clause that states that the developer provides for a public park 
available to those who live in the community; that the developer plows the 
streets adjacent to the project after a snow fall; that the developer employs 
at least fifty percent of the workforce from the community; that ten percent 
of the housing units in a proposed project are affordable housing units; and 
 
 5. See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concen-
trated Affluence And The Obligations Of The Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1, 5-26 (2006) (citations omitted). 
 6. See Id. at 26-28 (2006) (the process of gentrification has two different narratives, 
one that includes governmental involvement and one that does not. However, 
gentrification is exclusively a private enterprise that includes the purchasing of 
buildings by developers, speculators, or affluent people which changes the social 
character of the area in development) (citations omitted). 
 7. See generally Brian D. Feinstein & Ashley Allen, Community Benefits Agree-
ments With Transit Agencies: Neighborhood Change Along Boston’s Rail Lines 
And A Legal Strategy For Addressing Gentrification, 38 TRANSP. L.J. 85, 89 
(2011) 
 8. Naved Sheikh, Community Benefits Agreements: Can Private Contracts Replace 
Public Responsibility?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 228 (2008) internal 
citations omitted. 
 9. Id.; See also McFarlane, supra note 5, at 5. 
 10. Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, And The 
Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 509-10 (2009). 
 11. See Id.; see also generally McFarlane, supra note 6, at 5. 
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the list continues. Every CBA is unique, just as every contract between pri-
vate parties is unique. For the purpose of this paper we will explore the 
concept as a whole rather than the particulars of each agreement. 
The main goal of this paper is to identify the negative aspects of a CBA, 
and how those aspects effect the agreement. In order to understand the neg-
ative features of CBAs, we need to understand if and when a CBA will 
work in a way that truly benefits the community. Additionally, this paper 
discusses the positive qualities of CBAs, while contemplating methods to 
improve its functionality. CBAs are a great idea in theory, but three main 
reasons prevent CBAs from being effective: (1) they lack legal enforceabil-
ity; (2) communities lack political power to include tangible benefits; and 
lastly the question of whether accurate community representation takes 
place and the question of whether the desires of a community are included 
in the agreement. How do we rectify all of these problems? Is there a way to 
ensure that a CBA is a legally enforceable document? Is there a way to give 
communities political power? And is there a way to ensure that the commu-
nity’s goals are represented? 
In order to grasp whether this concept can be successful, we must first 
understand the history of CBAs. Part I of this paper describes the general 
purpose of a CBA, summarizes the components, and explains the history of 
CBAs. CBAs grew from a long history of negotiations between multiple ac-
tors, and are similar to, or a subset of, a traditional Development Agree-
ment.12 Part II provides three examples of CBAs: the Atlantic Yards CBA 
signed in 2005, the Bronx Terminal Market CBA signed in 2006, and a 
more recent CBA signed in February of 2016. This section will showcase 
the various benefits provided, but also reveal the downsides of these agree-
ments. 
Part III discusses the examples previously given and pinpoints the prob-
lems associated with those examples. For example, the lack of enforceabil-
ity because many community organizations do not have standing to file suit, 
or simply do not have the financial means and organizational skills to file a 
complaint against a developer with unlimited financial capabilities and po-
litical clout. Additionally, CBAs that do not bind future organizations or 
parties provide no remedies for communities in the future if a development 
project changes ownership. Many CBAs contain vague language such as “to 
the extent possible,” which gives developers a mechanism for default13 with 
no recourse. 
 
 12. Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool Or 
Another Variation On The Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 6 (2010). 
 13. Default in the sense that they are not bound to provide what was promised in the 
agreement. 
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Part IV proposes several ideas as to how we can rectify the problems 
mentioned in Part III. For example, creating a state statute, or a city or 
county ordinance that requires developers to enter into a legally binding 
contract with the community prior to a projects approval, at least in some 
part, may rectify the problems that occur. With proper legislation that re-
quires a developer to enter into a CBA coupled with rights given to the 
community to enforce the agreement, some of the inherent problems associ-
ated with CBAs can be solved. This paper’s conclusion suggests that, while 
CBAs have great intentions, the lack of legal enforceability combined with 
a community’s lack of power, the extent to which a CBA provides tangible 
benefits to the community is limited. 
PART I - WHAT IS A CBA? 
What is a CBA? Who is involved in a CBA? At what point in a devel-
opment’s life span is a CBA considered? Who negotiates with developers 
— the community, local governments or the state? When a CBA is in place, 
who is responsible to ensure compliance and who has standing to enforce 
such compliance? How do CBAs currently operate? Do CBAs work for the 
betterment of the community? These are just a few of the questions raised 
when CBAs are generally discussed. Years of negotiating agreements be-
tween private developers and citizens lead us to these questions. To answer 
those questions, we must first understand the general purpose and history of 
CBAs. 
A. CBAs spawned from Development Agreements 
CBAs are similar to, and can be understood as, a subspecies of another 
type of agreement, a development agreement. A development agreement is 
also a contract with a developer, but the other contracting party is a local 
governmental planning agency.14 These agreements involve a developer’s 
promise to restrict the use of land, or provide benefits to the general pub-
lic.15 In exchange, local governments promise to halt certain land use laws 
and zoning laws for a fixed period of time.16 By doing so, this provides 
guarantees to the developer that construction is not halted as a result of 
those laws.17 Many states have statutes pertaining to development agree-
ments, including: South Carolina, Oregon, New Jersey, Nevada, Louisiana, 
 
 14. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 2, at 331, n.6 (citing generally David L. Callies 
& Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions and the 
Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan 
and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. R. 663 (2001)). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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Idaho, Hawaii, Colorado, Arizona, and Washington.18 It is important to note 
that once a CBA has been finalized it can, in some cases, merge with the 
development agreement.19 It is also important to note that most states do not 
permit local governments to enter into development agreements; therefore, 
most CBAs are only enforceable through the contracting community organ-
izations.20 
 CBAs differ from development agreements because the parties to the 
contract are different. CBAs are contracts or agreements between a devel-
oper and a community organization, or a community coalition, in which the 
developer promises to provide specific accommodations to a community in 
exchange for their support for the project, or in exchange for a community’s 
pliancy towards a project.21 CBAs are bilateral contracts, meaning that both 
parties agree to the performance of a determined act in exchange for the 
other party’s performance of a determined act.22 They can contain specific 
stipulations concerning public benefits and amenities that a developer shall 
provide to the affected community.23 Although CBAs are considered a re-
cent concept in local economic development, they grew from a vast history 
of negotiations between a multitude of actors, such as developers, public 
officials, land use authorities, stake holders, environmental organizations, 
and communities.24 
B. History of CBAs 
The history of the modern understanding of a CBA originated from sev-
eral campaigns in the early nineties concerning the development of the en-
tertainment industry in California.25 One of the campaigns involved the Los 
Angeles Metropolitan Alliance Coalition (hereinafter “LAMA”)26 and 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 2, at 295. 
 20. Id. (citing Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Making Development 
Projects Accountable http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/publications/community-
benefits-agreements-making-development-projects-accountable (last visited April 
12, 2016)). 
 21. See generally Gross, supra note 4, at 36-7. 
 22. See generally Feinstein & Allen, supra note 7, at 98-99. 
 23. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 2, at 293-94. 
 24. See Been, supra note 12, at 6. 
 25. Doug Smith, Community Economic Development, Regionalism, and Regional 
Equity: Emerging Strategies and Changing Roles for CED Attorneys, J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L., 2013, at 315, 329-30 (2013) (ci-
tations omitted). 
 26. Id. at 326-29. (LAMA was a combination of several community groups and 
grassroots organizations such as Action for Grassroots Empowerment and Neigh-
borhood Development Alternatives (“AGENDA”), Community Economic De-
velopment Unit of the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles (“LAFLA”), and 
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DreamWorks Studios.27 LAMA, along with other organizations, noticed the 
swift development taking place in the entertainment industry in California, 
and the assortment of production companies and studios building congru-
ently.28 LAMA used the opportunity to address the needs of low-income 
communities adjacent to the construction and advancement taking place in 
the entertainment industry. The group negotiated with DreamWorks, and 
was able to come to an agreement that provided career opportunities and 
training to low-income residents of southern California.29 Unfortunately, 
DreamWorks did not proceed with their project for a new studio.30 Howev-
er, they did not abandon their promise to low-income residents and provid-
ed five million dollars to create an employment training organization called 
Workplace Hollywood.31 At the time of this agreement it was not termed a 
CBA, but it bears a striking resemblance to what we currently consider a 
CBA today. 
Another agreement in California in the late nineties that resembled a 
modern day version of a CBA related to the Hollywood and Highland Cen-
ter, a massive theatre and retail space.32 The estimated cost of the 1.2 mil-
lion square foot project was over three hundred million dollars and included 
parking lots, hotels, retail space, and over four thousand theatre seats.33 The 
thought of the immense flood of traffic, environmental concerns, and crimi-
nal activity among other things, worried the residents in Hollywood.34 Jack-
ie Goldberg, a council member in Los Angeles, teamed up with the Los 
Angeles Alliance for a New Economy to express the concerns of the citi-
zens of Hollywood.35 With the community, they were able to come to an 
agreement with the developer to ensure that this project was beneficial to all 
parties affected.36 The community supported the project while the developer 
agreed to establish a first source hiring plan within the community, and 
promised that the employees were to be paid living wages.37 
Additionally, the developer agreed to finance traffic improvements to the 
 
Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (“LAANE”)). 
 27. Id.; Our History, DREAMWORKS ANIMATION, LLC, 
https://www.dreamworksstudios.com/about/history (last visited May 1, 2016). 
 28. Smith, supra note 25, at 328-30. 
 29. Id. at 329-30. 
 30. Id. at 330. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Been, supra note 12, at 35. 
 33. Patricia E. Salkin, Understanding Community Benefit Agreements: Opportunities 
And Traps For Developers, Municipalities And Community Organizations, 
SN005 ALI-ABA 1407, 1412-13 (2007). 
 34. Id. at 22. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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area.38 The support from the community cemented the developer’s hopes to 
obtain subsidies from the city.39 As a result of the support from the commu-
nity, the city granted the developer $90 million in subsidies.40 There is de-
bate as to whether his agreement constitutes a CBA,41 however. Either way, 
this is a great example of the potential CBAs have to impact communities 
for the better.42 
C. CBAs Today 
After the success that multiple municipalities in California had with 
CBAs comparable to standard contracts, the entire state began to test the 
concept.43 Subsequently, CBAs engulfed California, and it did not take long 
for other states to experiment with their use. Eventually, community organ-
izations in other cities began to negotiate their own CBAs; these cities in-
clude, but are not limited to, New York, Chicago, Boston, Washington, and 
Miami.44 The agreements are negotiated on a case by case basis, which is 
very appealing to communities that have specific needs.45 Not only are the-
se agreements helpful for the communities that receive the benefits, but 
they are also a helpful tool for developers. If a particular developer seeks 
tax increment financing, government subsidies, zoning variances or permits, 
having support from the impacted community will greatly influence the de-
velopment’s approval.46 It can also expedite the required procedures.47 If a 
developer has a CBA in place prior to a plan’s approval, there will be less 
community criticism towards that project compared to the criticism a de-
veloper receives when it does not communicate with the affected communi-
ty.48 The support from the community could potentially save developers 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.; distinguished by Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local 
Government Tool Or Another Variation On The Exactions Theme?, 77 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 5, 35 (2010) (“…also might qualify as a CBA. However, because those ne-
gotiations involved a city council member, the agreement may be more appropri-
ately characterized as an exaction.”). 
 42. See Salkin, supra note 36, at 1412-13 (2007) (the Hollywood and Highland 
agreement was seen as a great success to both the developer and the community, 
and lead the way for the Staple Center CBA). 
 43. Been, supra note 12, at 10-11. 
 44. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 2, at 293-94. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See generally Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Making Develop-
ment Projects Accountable 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/cba2005final.pdf (last 
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money in the sense that negative feedback pertaining to their plans might 
result in losing project financing or legal fees.49 
Some CBAs have provisions that stipulate the developer hire a certain 
percentage of their employees locally, and that those employees are paid 
living wages. Although some believe paying living wages is counterproduc-
tive because developers would have to allocate more money for their em-
ployees, in the long run it actually saves developers money. Studies show 
that higher wage employees have less turnover resulting in increased 
productivity and the reduction of training and recruitment costs.50 Why 
would a developer resist a community demand for living wages when it is 
to the developer’s benefit? Meaning, why does the developer need the 
community to tell them how to best do their project? Why can’t they figure 
this out themselves? 
Additionally, a governmental body that provides financing to a developer 
is more likely to delay a project’s progress when there is a controversial is-
sue associated with the project, such as a community’s resistance.51 Devel-
opers often receive subsidies from cities or states as an incentive to build 
projects in those cities or states.52 Even though there is evidence to the con-
trary, municipalities believe that providing subsidies will lure developers to 
their locations, which eventually leads to positive outcomes for the commu-
nity.53 If a CBA is linked to a subsidy, or a similar incentive from the gov-
ernment, community organizations have power if they can influence which 
developer is awarded the subsidy. 54 
A government agency can play an active role in the negotiation process, 
but that does not necessarily mean that the agency’s involvement is re-
quired.55 Many CBAs involve real estate transactions.56 Therefore, commu-
 
visited April 12, 2016). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 39. (“One study found that employers’ costs from turnover are at least 
150% of the employees’ base salary. In addition, some costs of higher wages are 
either absorbed by the employer or passed on to consumers. In general, studies 
find that the overall cost to employers of paying a living wage is minimal.”) 
 51. Id. at 22. 
 52. Schragger, supra note 10, at 495. 
 53. See Id. 
 54. Been, supra note 12, at 10-11. 
 55. See Id. at 7-8, citing for example, ATLANTIC YARDS DEVELOPMENT CO, Commu-
nity Benefits Agreement 54 (Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development, 
June 27, 2005), available at http://www.buildbrooklyn.org/pr/cba.pdf (last visited 
Nov 9, 2009) (showing Mayor Michael Bloomberg signing as “witness”), citing 
also Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and Le-
gal Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS & CMTY. DEV. L. 35, 42 (2008) (not-
ing that the Bronx borough president and three members of the city council 
signed the New York Yankees CBA) citing also for example Gross, LeRoy, and 
Janis-Aparicio, Community Benefits Agreements at 29 (cited in note 1). 
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nity organizations have power based in their capacity to aid or block re-
quired land use approvals that a developer must obtain.57 Therefore, when a 
developer is able to guarantee community support with a CBA prior to their 
request from the government, their ability to navigate through regulatory 
and funding obstacles could considerably change for the better.58 
Throughout the lifespan of a development project there is no specific 
time that CBA negotiations must take place. However, for a community that 
wants their demands heard, the most beneficial timeframe for negotiations 
to take place is after a developer announces their plan, but prior to their 
plan’s approval. Developers may begin their discussions with the communi-
ty before or after the project’s approval, or never at all.59 Community organ-
izations may approach the developer at any point during this process, or 
never at all.60 There is no set time frame that a developer, or a community, 
must contact each other to negotiate. Negotiations work best for the com-
munity if that community has a large number of constituents that are vocal 
and involved in the process, and if the developer needs their support to ob-
tain approval or subsidies.61 Communities participate and express their con-
cerns through surveys, workshops, public meetings and public hearings.62 
The appointed leaders of a community group, coalition, or organization are 
the individuals that are most heavily involved in the negotiation process.63 
PART II - EXAMPLES OF CBAS IN ACTION 
The reputation of the Californian CBAs is positive.64 Those agreements 
provided an avenue for community involvement in an otherwise hostile, 
public review process of private development projects.65 However, this sec-
tion provides three examples that cast doubt on the legitimacy of such 
agreements. We will focus on the Atlantic Yards CBA in 2005, the Bronx 
Terminal Market CBA in 2006, and a recently signed CBA in February of 
2016. By examining these agreements, we can identify the benefits provid-
ed and the recipients of those that receive the benefits. Additionally, after 
reviewing these CBAs scrupulously, we begin to understand the inherent 
problems. Analyzing the provisions and clauses of each CBA demonstrates 
 
 56. Been, supra note 12, at 10-11. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Been, supra note 55, at 10-11. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 23, 296-97. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Been, supra note 12, at 7. 
 64. Sheikh, supra note 8, at 225. 
 65. Id.  
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that these agreements lack enforceability, lack tangible benefits for the 
community, and lack community representation. 
A. Atlantic Yards CBA 
One of the more recent and famous CBAs took place in New York 
City.66 It is widely known as the Atlantic Yards CBA, or plainly, Atlantic 
Yards. The location for the project was downtown Brooklyn, in an area that 
was previously State owned.67 The development plans included retail space, 
housing, and office space.68 The project received $300 million in subsidies 
from New York State and New York City.69 The developer announced the 
project in December of 2003, and in June of 2005 the CBA was signed. 
The agreement itself planned to address many different issues for the 
community and the concerns associated with the development. This includ-
ed, but was not limited to, job development and training, educational initia-
tives, public housing, environmental impacts as a result of the project, and 
small business development.70 The Atlantic Yards CBA promised numerous 
benefits to the community which were not available prior to the agree-
ment.71 For example, the CBA contained provisions that pertained to job 
training, a health center, affordable housing units, and community amenities 
such as an open, green space.72 
The Atlantic Yards CBA received positive and negative feedback. The 
negotiations between the community groups and the developer took place 
secretly, and did not include a large portion of the community.73 Additional-
ly, “the project’s government partner, a state economic development author-
ity, overrode all of the local zoning and planning laws in order to expedite 
the development.”74 Because of this, the project’s approval was not re-
viewed by city officials and was finalized before an environmental impact 
statement or study was conducted.75 Members of the community organiza-
tions involved in the CBA are already upset with the lack of benefits pro-
 
 66. Id. at 230-32. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Nathan Markey, Atlantic Yards Community Benefit Agreement: A Case Study Of 
Organizing Community Support For Development, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 
383-87 (2010) (estimating the $300 million figure and arguing that the Atlantic 
Yards CBA would benefit the community if not for the negative pushback). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 1, at 198-99. 
 74. Id. (because there was not an environmental impact statement many of the CBA 
signatories are, most likely, unaware of the extent of the impact of from the pro-
ject). 
 75. Id. 
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vided, even though there were specific provisions in the agreement.76 Alt-
hough a job training program did launch, unfortunately, the launching lead 
to a law suit instead of tangible careers.77 According to community mem-
bers, employment has not increased and little business has developed as a 
result of the Atlantic Yards CBA. Subsequently, members of the communi-
ty created a Twitter Campaign called “Devotion NYC” to raise community 
awareness and public pressure in the hopes to help their efforts of enforcing 
the agreement.78 
B. Bronx Market Terminal CBA 
Another CBA that took place in New York City was the Bronx Market 
Terminal. This CBA was signed in February of 2006. Prior to the develop-
ment of this area, Exterior Street in the Bronx, some considered the area 
blighted. The project planned to turn the Bronx Terminal Market into a re-
tail complex. The terminal was originally built in the 1920s, and prior to the 
insurgence of redevelopment, the area provided space for local venders and 
small businesses for decades. Among other provisions, the developer prom-
ised the community a new public park, a commitment to make “reasonable 
efforts” to employ union labor, a local hiring program, training and appren-
ticeship programs, and agreed not to lease retail space to Wal-Mart.79 As of 
2011, 75% of the jobs associated with this project were awarded to Bronx 
residents and 40% of the contracts were awarded to Bronx based business, 
which actually exceeded the requirement in the CBA.80 One of the com-
plaints pertaining to this CBA is that the negotiation process was extremely 
secretive.81 This left many community groups and organizations out of the 
agreement; therefore it did not represent the community as a whole.82 
 
 76. See Norman Oder, Fair Play! New effort (from former BUILD officer) to enforce 
Community Benefits Agreement, despite lack of formal standing, ATLANTIC 
YARDS/PACIFIC PARK REPORT (Feb. 11, 2016), 
http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2016/02/fair-play-new-effort-from-
former-build.html (law suit was settled with undisclosed terms). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See The Gateway Center at Bronx Terminal Market CBA, COMMUNITY 
BENEFITS AGREEMENTS (Aug. 14, 2009), 
http://communitybenefits.blogspot.com/2009/08/gateway-center-at-bronx-terminal-
market.html. 
 80. Summary and Index of Community Benefit Agreements, THE PUBLIC LAW 
CENTER, 1, 23 (2011) 
http://www.law.tulane.edu/uploadedFiles/Institutes_and_Centers/Public_Law_Center/S
ummary 
%20and%20Index%20of%20%20Community%20Benefit%20Agreements.pdf. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
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C. Bridgeport Connecticut Community Environmental Benefits Agreement 
A more recent CBA signed in February 2016, promises to focus on the 
environmental impact of a new gas fired plant in Bridgeport Connecticut.83 
The agreement contained a health related project for Bridgeport residents, 
improvements for environmental benefits, plans to retire the coal-fired 
Bridgeport Harbor Station power plan, renewable energy investments, and a 
community liaison officer to be the main point of contact with community 
groups to work with the community to support local and regional hiring.84 
The Mayor of Bridgeport Connecticut stated that, “[t]his will create hun-
dreds of jobs, replace the last coal fired plant in Connecticut, and contribute 
an estimated $5,000,000 annually to our tax base. This will move us to a 
cleaner energy future and give us reliable power for many years.”85 
Only the future will tell what comes of this CBA; however, there are a 
few provisions contained within this agreement that already cause concern. 
For example, page six of the agreement states that: 
[T]he parties agree that there is no exception or limitation to the com-
mitment of the Community groups not to oppose the Project or issuance of 
any Permit for the Project for any reason in any local, state or federal ex-
ecutive, legislative or judicial form provided [there are no] Material 
Change[s] to the Project.86 
If I were a member of the community this would puzzle me and scare 
me. This provision seems like a slippery slope, and that the developer has 
the potential to take advantage of the community’s demands or opinions if 
they feel strongly about a particular issue. Also, what does the term “mate-
rial change” mean? The CBA does not contain specific definitions or exam-
ples of the term “material change” or of what a material change could look 
like. There is other vague language in this CBA that states the developer 
will make good faith efforts to hire locally.87 What are “good efforts”? Ad-
ditionally, the project cost is $550 million; however, it is only estimated to 
create 300 jobs, only 20 of which are permanent. 
 
 83. This CBA slightly differs from others as it focuses on the environment, as well as 
the community. This CBA is a Community Environmental Benefit Agreement. 
For the purpose of this paper I will continue to use the term CBA for this particu-
lar agreement. 
 84. Mayor Joseph P. Ganim Bridgeport, CT, Press Release Announcing Signing of 
Community Environmental Benefits Agreement (Feb. 25, 2016), 
http://www.ct.gov/csc/lib/csc/pending_petitions/2_petitions_1201through1300/pe
1218/filing/pe1218_exhibitg.pdf (this contains the press release and a copy of the 
actual agreement). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 8 (discussing only material changes related to permits). 
 87. Id. at 10. 
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PART III - WHAT ARE THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF CBAS? 
Now that we appreciate the content of a CBA, we can hone our focus on 
the negative aspects of a CBA. We examined the provisions of the CBAs 
mentioned in Part II and now we can address the inherent problems. Ana-
lyzing the provisions and clauses of each CBA demonstrates that these 
agreements lack enforceability, lack tangible benefits for the community, 
and lack community representation. 
A. CBAs lack enforceability 
One of the biggest underlying issues associated with CBAs is the ques-
tion of enforceability. It depends on who actually signs the document and 
the nature of the provisions included in the document.88 If a community or-
ganization is included in the CBA, and legally signs the agreement, techni-
cally they have legal standing to attempt its enforcement.89 As a general 
practice, however, contract law only permits signatories and parties to the 
contract to enforce its provisions.90 Therefore all community organizations, 
or coalitions, should ideally sign a CBA separately to ensure that each 
group can attempt enforcement.91 If not, an organization that took part in 
negotiations but did not sign the physical document may not have standing 
to enforce the agreement.92 
“[L]egal enforceability should be a prerequisite for something to be 
termed a CBA,”93 but how do we make that a reality? CBAs that do not 
bind future organizations or parties provide no remedies for communities in 
the future if a development company is purchased by another business, or if 
a community association decides to reorganize. A CBA that does not bind 
future parties can cause future problems “in determining the allocation of 
rights and remedies under the CBA.”94 One of the provisions of a CBA 
should bind future tenants, contractors, buyers, or community groups to the 
provisions within the agreement.95 If this provision is not included, future 
parties are not bound to the provisions contained therein and will lack pow-
 
 88. See generally Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Making Develop-
ment Projects Accountable 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/cba2005final.pdf (last 
visited April 12, 2016). 
 89. Feinstein & Allen, supra note 7, at 98-99. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Gross, supra note 4, at 39. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Feinstein & Allen, supra note 7, at 98-99. 
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er to enforce those provisions.96 
Another issue relating to the parties signing a CBA is that many commu-
nity organizations are unincorporated, therefore when an individual signs 
the CBA they must confirm that they are signing on behalf of the organiza-
tion.97 And, they must confirm that they have the power to make such a sig-
nature.98 On top of being unincorporated, many community groups lack the 
organization skills and funding to file a complaint against a developer with 
unlimited financial capabilities and political clout. 
B. Vague provisions in a CBA lead to confusion and more enforceability 
issues 
Irrespective of a party’s ability to enforce the document, many CBAs in-
clude vague provisions and undefinable language, so much so that an at-
tempt to enforce a certain provision is futile. For example, in the CBA be-
tween the Atlantic Yards Development and various New York City 
coalitions, some of the benefits conferred to the community are followed by 
provisions that state “to the extent possible[.]”99Including such language 
leaves room for developers to renege on their promises.100 The Atlantic 
Yards CBA also contains language that allows the developer to change cer-
tain aspects of the development at their discretion. For example the Atlantic 
Yards agreement states, “[t]he Developer may change the Development 
Phases in their sole discretion prior to commencement of the first Develop-
ment phase; provided that they shall provide advance notice to the Execu-
tive Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.”101 One could think of a 
situation where the first phase was a week away from starting and the de-
veloper needed to make a change, would that leave enough time to notify 
the committee “as soon as reasonably possible[?]”102 Language such as, 
“make every effort[,]”103 or “hire a portion” of individuals from the com-
munity,104 or “dedicate resources [the developer] deems reasonably neces-
sary” is indeterminate and unclean. Does this type of language indicate that 
communities are to assume that developers will honor the agreement? 
Should communities take the developers word for it, with little recourse in 
the event that a developer violates the contract? It seems as if developers 
specifically add provisions that are vague, mysterious, and unenforceable. 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Sheikh, supra note 8, at 233-36. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Atlantic Yards, Community Benefits Agreement, at page 34. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 11. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 13. 
 104. Id. at 15. 
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Unlike developers that have the opportunity to break their promises, once 
the project is completed the community does not have the luxury of retract-
ing their support. After completion of the project the community already 
has a stadium or Wal-Mart in the neighborhood, or members of the com-
munity were already forced to relocate. Additionally, even if one of the 
community coalitions involved in the Atlantic Yards CBA wanted to en-
force the document, the developer still has a way to skirt its obligation. As 
it states: 
“If, at completion of construction of each Development Phase, the ICM 
determines that the relevant Developer has not adequately fulfilled its obli-
gations under this initiative, such Developer shall pay to Executive Com-
mittee, as liquidated damages for such failure, in accordance with Section 
XIII, Part C below, the sum of $500,000 to be used by BUILD to fund the 
Pre-Apprentice Training Initiative. Upon making such payment, all of the 
Developer’s obligations under this Section for the Development Phase at 
issue shall terminate.” 
Although 500,000 dollars is a significant amount of money to any lay 
person, that amount is not unfathomable for any large company. In fact, it is 
routine for developers to exchange millions of dollars during the course of 
the projects. Therefore, if a developer can afford to breach the contract, pay 
the amount stipulated, and only needs the CBA to appease the community, 
or local officials, what is stopping them from executing an agreement 
knowing that they plan on defaulting? They simply pay the fine and are 
thereby not required to provide the promised benefit? A developer’s prom-
ises are not the only vague aspects of the Atlantic Yards CBA. It is unclear 
as to what the community organizations support obligations are to the de-
veloper, whether they are political or verbal.105 
One aspect of the Atlantic Yards CBA is very clear. If any community 
groups that signed the CBA fails to perform the tasks given to them, that 
group will default and only has 60 days to remedy that default.106 At that 
point the parties will mediate, and if that fails the developer suspends their 
obligations under the CBA.107 
C. Who are the parties involved? Do CBAs represent the community? Are 
they inclusive? 
As previously mentioned in Part I, if a governmental agency is a party to 
the contract or if the CBA is incorporated into the development agreement, 
the enforceability issues differ from that of a regular bilateral contract. If a 
 
 105. See Sheikh, supra note 7, at 233-36. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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community organization is as a third party beneficiary in a development 
agreement because the CBA was incorporated into that document, questions 
of enforceability still exist. However there is precedent that suggests a 
community organization, as a third party beneficiary, can enforce the CBA 
through the development agreement.108 Even though development agree-
ments provide the best framework for the incorporation of a CBA, it is im-
portant to remember that most states do not permit local governments to en-
ter into development agreements.109 Therefore, most CBAs can only be 
enforced by the contracting community organizations.110 
If most states do not allow local governments to enter into development 
agreements, therefore making it nearly impossible for a CBA’s incorpora-
tion, there any use or benefit for the community as a party in the CBA con-
tract? Why would a community organization become involved in a project 
when the promised benefits are not guaranteed and there is no method to 
enforce the promise? This is a continuous overarching concern associated 
with CBAs.111 When a CBA is executed, without incorporation into a de-
velopment agreement, how can we ensure that the community can actually 
enforce its provisions? Must community organizations have clout to attempt 
enforcement? If a community organization is concerned about a proposed 
development that affects land use entitlements or other environmental con-
cerns, how can they ensure their opinions are considered? 
As seen in the Bronx Terminal CBA, inclusivity is not always guaran-
teed. When a CBA is inclusive, it allows for the discussion of community 
interests and gives the sense that what is taking place satisfies community’s 
interests.112 For a CBA to be effective, the community groups involved need 
sufficient leverage to achieve their goals, and sufficient leverage to attempt 
enforcement.113 A community’s leveraging power usually stems from the 
amount of their public participation, inclusivity in the negotiation process, 
and their ability to hold elected officials accountable.114 In certain cases, a 
 
 108. Feinstein & Allen, supra note 7, 98-99. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 2, at 295. 
 111. Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, And Legal 
Enforceability, 17:1-2 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 35, 36 (2008). 
(“When promises are not enforceable, community groups that care about those 
promises are justly skeptical as to whether they will be kept—and are wise to take 
that into account when considering whether to support or oppose a project. This 
concern has been part of the impetus toward CBAs, which are only one of several 
viable legal mechanisms that can create private enforcement rights with regard to 
community benefits commitments.”). 
 112. Markey, supra note 69, at 391-92. 
 113. See Harold Meyerson, No Justice, No Growth, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Nov. 
2006), http://prospect.org/article/no-justice-no-growth. 
 114. See Benjamin Beach, Strategies and Lessons from the Los Angeles Community 
Benefits Experience, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 77, 94-95 
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developer needs the project to be in a specific location or needs to obtain 
subsides for their project.115 This could provide a large amount of leverage 
to the community organizations in that particular area.116 CBAs “work best 
when there is substantial agency money invested, when they [are] big pro-
jects, and when they [are] in hot markets or emerging markets.”117 Howev-
er, when the area is not an emerging market the proposal of a CBA can per-
suade the developer from investing in that area and push them to find less 
expensive locations.118 
Additionally, the amount of time, effort, money, and power needed to 
create a well-functioning community organization is a not an easy task.119 
Community organizations are often disorganized, underfunded, and do not 
represent all interests of the community.120 The level of effort, organiza-
tional skills, and financial obligations drastically increases when varying 
community coalitions must unite to tackle a developer with unlimited fi-
nances and political power.121 Also, it is naïve to think that community or-
ganizations that live in the same area will have identical goals.122 Unfortu-
nately, a developer will often require that community organizations act 
collectively to obtain the benefits requested. If those groups are unable to 
do so, developers entice specific groups to push their agenda or become a 
party to the contract.123 This leads to conflict between members of the 
community and often leads certain organizations being unrepresented in the 
 
(2008). 
 115. See Meyerson, supra note 113. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Beach, supra note 113, at 94-95. 
 119. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 2, at 31. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (“Where a coalition is inexperienced in creating CBAs, for example, it may 
need guidance as to the types of benefits that it can receive. The funding required 
to conduct research for CBA provisions and to pay for legal counsel may also in-
hibit the negotiating process.”). 
 122. For example, in the 21211 zip code, the Greater Remington Improvement Asso-
ciation has significantly different goals compared to the Remington Neighbor-
hood Alliance. The Greater Remington Improvement Association is in support of 
neighborhood commercial, while the Remington Neighborhood Alliance is 
against neighborhood commercial. See, e.g., Neighborhood Plan, Greater Re-
mington Improvement Association, http://www.griaonline.org/neighborhood-
plan/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2017); see also Neighborhood Commercial, Zoning 
Matters in Remington: Saving Remington from the New Zoning Code, 
http://zoningremington.blogspot.com/p/neighborhood-commercial.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 28, 2017).  
 123. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 2 at 31 (citing Suzette Parmley, Trump the best 
known city casino-game player, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 15, 2006.). 
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agreement and having no influence in the negotiation process. 124 
It is also naïve to think that community organizations have the skills nec-
essary to negotiate with developers that have significant experience in that 
area.125 This results in an unfair advantage for the developer.126 Community 
organizations are disadvantaged, yet again, because they do not have the fi-
nancial resources to hire attorneys or separate organizations to conduct the 
research necessary to create legally enforceable provisions and to pay for 
counsel.127 
D. Do CBAs violate land use doctrine? 
Another problem associated with CBAs is that there is the potential to 
violate certain land use doctrines.128 More specifically, the principles set 
forth in the Nollan and Dolan cases.129 Essentially, both of those cases held 
that the when the government grants a benefit to a beneficiary, the govern-
ment cannot grant that benefit with a condition that makes the beneficiary 
surrender a Constitutional right.130 An argument for developers is that the 
government forces them, as property owners, to accept a benefit subject to a 
condition. The condition of entering into a contract, which is a condition 
not permitted by our Constitution or our land use laws.131 However, com-
munities can argue that the condition of entering into a CBA substantially 
furthers a governmental purpose or public need. The governmental or pub-
lic purpose being the needs and rights of the community, and ensuring that 
their voices are heard in this process, or the needs and right of the constitu-
ents of the government officials. The conditions imposed are to protect the 
public interest and public welfare. When a CBA is not contingent upon a 
subsidy and is solely a private agreement, this allows communities to avoid 
these predicaments. 132However, this also poses problems because there is 
no incentive for the developer to negotiate with the community, and we re-
vert back to all the other problems previously mentioned. 
PART IV - HOW CAN WE ENSURE THAT CBAS GENUINELY 
BENEFIT THE COMMUNITY? 
How do we rectify all of these problems previously mentioned? Is there a 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Sheikh, supra note 8, at 237-38. 
 129. See generally Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Been, supra note 12, at 17.   
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way to ensure that a CBA is a legally enforceable document? Is there a way 
to give communities power? And is there a way to ensure a CBA represents 
the goals of the community? 
A. Community organization need the authority to achieve their goals, and 
CBAs must be inclusive 
For a CBA to be effective, the community groups involved need suffi-
cient leverage to achieve their goals, and sufficient leverage to attempt en-
forcement.133 A community’s leveraging power usually stems from the 
amount of their public participation, and their ability to hold elected offi-
cials accountable.134 Also, in certain cases, a developer needs their project 
to be in a specific location or needs to obtain subsides for their project.135 
This could provide a large amount of leverage to the community organiza-
tions in that particular area.136 CBAs “work best when there is substantial 
agency money invested, when they [are] big projects, and when they [are] 
in hot markets or emerging markets.”137 Additionally, CBAs need involve-
ment from various community organizations and members to truly capture 
the needs of the community. Without substantial involvement from a di-
verse group of community members, there is no way to determine if the to-
tality of the community is considered. Even if a particular community or-
ganization is not able to achieve all of their goals, the fact that they were a 
part of the process and expressed their concerns is sufficient and reflects the 
foundation of our democracy. 
B. CBAs need to be legally enforceable documents 
 “[L]egal enforceability should be a prerequisite for something to be 
termed a CBA.”138 However, how do make that a reality? If we require de-
velopers to enter into a legally binding contract with the community prior to 
obtaining a bid, or prior to any form of land use, zoning, or subsidy approv-
al that can solve, at least in some part, the issue of enforceability. Develop-
ers target specific locations near sports stadiums, shopping centers, colleg-
es, and airports.139 Without any government involvement, it can be difficult 
for developers to actually obtain those specific sites. If we elected our offi-
cials, and we are the people, how can we be overlooked in this process? 
 
 133. See Meyerson, supra note 113. 
 134. See Beach, supra note 114, at 94-95. 
 135. See Meyerson, supra note 113. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Gross, supra note 4, at 39. 
 139. Smith, supra note 25, at 328-29. 
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Why are our government officials, that we elected, not acting in our best in-
terest? 
There are a few different options that we can request our legislature take. 
One statutory change that could take place would be the addition of a CBA 
requirement or CBA language into our Procurement statute. Procurement is 
“the process of (i) leasing real or personal property as lessee; or (ii) buying 
or otherwise obtaining supplies, services, construction, construction related 
services, architectural services, engineering services, or services provided 
under an energy performance contract[.]”140Procurement allows various 
mechanisms for procuring goods, such as: negotiation for social and educa-
tional services, auction bids, intergovernmental cooperative purchasing and 
competitive bidding.141 
Additionally, Procurement provides for certain statutory remedies.142 
This statute would be an ideal placement for language that involved the 
contracting of CBAs, their requirement prior to obtaining procured services 
or the like, and their legal enforceability. However, certain agencies are not 
required to abide by the State’s procurement laws.143 
C. Add additional safeguards to Maryland’s Land Use regulations 
Language added to Maryland’s land use regulations, formerly known as 
the Development Rights and Responsibilities Agreement, could provide an-
other statutory remedy for CBAs.144 There are a few different sections of 
Maryland’s land use statutory regulations that provide a natural extension 
of the statutes to discuss CBAs and their enforceability. For example, sec-
tion 3-206 Municipal Growth Element states, “[w]hen developing a munic-
ipal growth element of the comprehensive plan, a municipal corporation 
shall consult with the counties in which the municipal corporation is locat-
ed.”145 A progression from this could provide simple language that stated 
prior to a comprehensive plan’s approval, a developer shall discuss with the 
community potential benefits conferred onto that community, or shall enter 
into a legally binding contract with the community that growth is proposed 
 
 140. State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 92 A.3d 400, 431-32 (Md. 
2014). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 431-32 (2014) citing Building Materials Corp. of America v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Baltimore Cnty., 428 Md. 572, 576, 53 A.3d 347, 349 (2012) (noting that local 
school boards are not subject to the State’s general procurements laws). 
 144. Maryland’s Development Rights and Responsibilities Agreement statute was re-
pealed in 2012, and “[t]his section is new language derived without substantive 
change from former Art. 66B, § 3.05(e)(2) through (6).” Land Use, 2012 Mary-
land Laws Ch. 426 at 76 (H.B. 1290). 
 145. Md. Land Use § 3-206 (a)(1). 
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to transpire in. Similarly, a planning commission is allowed to: 
[A]gree with an applicant on use, height, area, or bulk requirements or 
restrictions that are designed to promote the purposes of the zoning law of 
the local jurisdiction…[and t]he requirements or restrictions shall have the 
same force of law, shall be enforceable in the same manner and with the 
same sanctions and penalties, and shall be subject to the same power of 
amendment or repeal as though part of the zoning law or map of the local 
jurisdiction[.]146 
The planning commission can require that a CBA is entered into prior to 
approval, and use the exact language in the previous quotation to give a 
CBA “the same force of law”147 and “enforceable in the same manner and 
with the same sanctions and penalties.”148 Similarly a planning commission 
agrees on certain requirements or restrictions, so why not make one of those 
requirements a CBA? 
Another statute that can potentially include CBA language, is the Mary-
land Land Use Statute 7-101. This statute provides for the preservation of 
natural resources or the establishment of affordable housing. There is actu-
ally a bill currently attempting to get passed that provides for annual fund-
ing for development purposes, and there are hopes to insert some language 
that pertains to affordable housing. This is the type of statutory approach 
that could ensure the community benefits when development projects take 
place. It ties development funding to affordable housing, and mandates 
some level of community engagement in the planning process. Although 
this does not directly address CBAs, it is a small step towards the bigger 
picture. A statutory approach is a better alternative instead of case-by-case 
negotiations between developers and community groups that are controlled 
heavily on power dynamics. 
However, we must remember that Maryland is a Home Rule state. There-
fore, most municipalities, within the grant of powers given from the Mary-
land State Constitution, are able to exercise all applicable power and make 
changes to their local charter. Therefore, if statutory reform were to take 
place pertaining to CBAs, each county would need to do so separately, as 
long as there is no conflicting state statute and it is within the power dele-
gated by the State to the counties. 
CONCLUSION 
Although CBAs seem like a great idea in theory, they lack legal enforce-
ability, communities lack political power to include tangible benefits, and 
 
 146. Land Use, 2012 Maryland Laws Ch. 426 at 112 (H.B. 1290). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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often the communities are not truly represented in the agreements. If we 
want CBAs to work to they need to be inclusive, legally enforceable, and 
concrete as to what is provided and when. Regardless of whether a statute is 
created, or changed, to ensure that a CBA will work, it is important to rec-
ognize providing a benefit “to the extent possible” is equivalent to nothing. 
